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00:00:00 	 Squire L. Brown: Today is August 22, 2006.  We are talking with Mr. 
William F. Bahret.  In his professional career, Mr. Bahret was a specialist 
in radar signature phenomenon.  At the conclusion of his career, he was 
recognized with various awards from professional societies and from the 
Air Force for his many contributions to stealth technology.  The interview
is being conducted in the studios of the Center for Teaching and Learning
at Wright State University as part of the Cold War Aerospace Technology 
History Project. The interviewer is Squire Brown.  Thank you very much 
for talking with us today, Mr. Bahret. 
Mr. Bahret, you were a participant in the development of 
technologies for the Air Force during several decades of the Cold War.  
Will you please provide a synopsis of your professional career, beginning 
with your university education, and perhaps a few comments on why you 
chose engineering. 
00:01:20	 William F. Bahret:  Well, as I got out of service at the end of World War 
II, I went into school. I graduated from the RCA Institute of Technology 
in New York, and after that, I guess, for the next twenty or more years 
while I was working, I just kept on going to different schools.  I think I’ve 
attended almost every one in existence—University of Michigan, Wright 
State, Ohio State, University of Dayton, Sinclair.  And I think some of it 
rubbed off, but probably not as much as could have.  But I enjoyed doing 
that all the while. Quite often, you know, when you’re working and 
you’re busy and you travel, you kind of get a little fouled up in taking 
courses, because like I was assigned to a project with Germany and so I 
decided why not learn technical German?  So AFIT had a three-semester 
course. Unfortunately after the first semester, they sent me overseas for 
about two weeks, and that was the end of that.  So, you know that sort of 
thing. But otherwise, it was very good. 
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How did I wind up doing this sort of thing?  Well, it’s kind of 
interesting. I had an uncle who was a two-star general in the Signal Corps, 
and, as you know, in the early years, the Air Force was under the Signal 
Corps. He actually worked in research at Wright Field, and ever since I 
was a little kid I said, “That’s what I want to do.”  By golly, I wound up 
doing that. So, I guess I was just lucky. 
00:03:16 	 Brown: Had you had a fascination with radio, electromagnetics, from an 
early stage, or was that something you just sort of wandered into? 
00:03:27 	 Bahret: Electromagnetics is not something you get a fascination at an 
early age. In fact, if you can spell it, you’re doing pretty well.  Now that’s 
a little tough. But, yes, I was always interested in radio and that sort of 
thing. My dad used to piddle around and build crystal sets and things like 
that, so, yes, you fiddle around, get shocked now and then, and so forth 
and so on. But, you learn. 
00:03:57 	 Brown: Your initial assignment to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base was 
to one of the Air Force laboratories.  When you arrived there, was it 
apparent to you that you were a participant in the Cold War?  How did the 
laboratory leadership convey to you your role to the nation’s defense? 
00:04:20 	 Bahret: Well, of course, when you work in the laboratory, you know 
pretty well that in the normal cycle, it’s forever and a day before 
something gets into the inventory, usually.  There are exceptions, and 
we’ll talk about some of those later. And they were pleasant exceptions. 
But generally speaking, you know, we figured, well we’re just going to do 
research on things that would make the bad guys life a little more 
miserable.  I happened to work in the Electronic Warfare division of the 
Avionics Lab, as it subsequently became known.  And of course in the 
Electronic Warfare division, we were doing things that supposedly would 
defeat the other guy’s radars or other sensors, and my part in that, of 
course, was in radar signature. But there were other people doing jammers 
and processors and receivers and so forth and so on.  So collectively, we 
knew we were trying to beat the other guy, and we had an awful lot of 
intelligence information that let us get a clue as to what direction they 
were taking. 
00:05:45 	 Brown: Perhaps this would be a good time to ask you to expand upon the 
role of intelligence organizations.  How did you receive information on 
Soviet systems?  Who provided that?  And was it credible? 
00:06:02 	 Bahret: Actually, we worked extremely closely with what was then called 
Foreign Technology Division. They are the people who are responsible 
for assessing potential enemy capabilities.  As it turned out, many, many 
years later, after the Cold War simmered down, we actually got to meet 
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some of our counterparts from Russia, and I have to say that all too often 
the intelligence assessments were far, far too optimistic in terms of what 
they were able to do. I guess it scared a lot of people over here, and 
maybe inspired more things, but the fact of that matter was, when I finally 
met my counterparts and we sat down and had a big orange together, 
turned out they were probably twenty years behind us, at least in the 
signature area particularly. I mean, one of—oh, I don’t know if we’re 
getting ahead of ourselves, but—for example, everybody says well if you 
want to reduce signature, you’ve got to have radar absorbent materials, 
magic stuff that just sops up the other guy’s radar, you know.   
Well, one of the tricks, one of the difficulties in developing things 
like that is measuring the components that you use to make an absorber.  It 
may not seem like a big thing to you, but let me tell you that we had all 
kinds of good arithmetic that we could design the materials.  We knew 
what to put in them.  But, you know, it’s like mother’s recipe for duck 
soup, first you have to find the duck! And it’s only when we learned how 
to make good measurements of materials’ properties were we able to 
actually make a design that was mathematically possible.  And we could 
do it predictably. We never failed after that.  But they never got to that 
point. They had, the fellows I met, they had techniques for measuring 
materials that were, well, they were the crudest.  They were at our starting 
point twenty years earlier, when we got out there and we didn’t know how 
to do it and we fiddled. They were still fiddling when the Cold War 
ended. So they would have had troubles. 
00:08:49 	 Brown: Let me make sure that I’m clear on your statements here.  At the 
end of the Cold War when you were able to actually visit the former 
Soviet Union—today, Russia—you were able to ascertain that the Soviets 
were perhaps a couple of decades behind the United States, is that correct? 
00:09:20 	 Bahret: Actually, I never did get to visit, but what happened was certain 
intelligence agencies after the war, they got some of these people to come 
over here. For example, one day I was called and said, “Show up to Ohio 
State University.” They were having this fellow from a Soviet research 
establishment in Moscow.  He was coming over ostensibly to have lunch 
and meet the people from Ohio State. In fact, a lot of the people eating 
there were not from Ohio State, but that’s another point.  But they made 
me sit next to him.  He spoke excellent English, and we got to talking 
about this, that and the other thing, and he showed me some pictures of 
their facilities, and they were just terribly, terribly crude.  I don’t know 
whether this is too technical or not, but one of the things in measuring 
material properties, it’s a good thing not to let the edges of a sample 
dominate things.  And the way you do that is you could put it in a wave 
guide or a coaxial line or something like that, and that eliminates the edge.  
They still had them on a pole on a flat plate out there in a room like this.  
They couldn’t have gotten the right number if they tried for a hundred 
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years. And, you know, I didn’t say anything to him, but later the other 
people said, you know, “Bahret, what do you think?”  I said, “Do you 
want to know the truth?” I said, “Yeah, they’re way behind.  Way 
behind.” 
00:11:07 	 Brown: So in your professional estimate, then, they were still not yet 
capable of producing a stealth aircraft? 
00:11:16 	 Bahret: No, no. No, not anything like we could here.  You know, that’s 
true in most countries I’ve been to, a lot of the NATO countries, for 
instance. And, you know, they tell you not to say too much, but keep your 
ears and eyes open as usual, and most of them are still struggling.  But, on 
the other hand, the United States is a pretty big country. And a lot of these 
other places—Russia’s is equally big, of course—but France or Germany 
or something like there, they’re just a little bit bigger than a state here, so 
you really can’t expect them to have either the number of people to think 
about it or the resources to attack it. 
00:12:14 	 Brown: Let’s drop back, return to the U.S., with this question please.  
You were one of the pioneers in the technology of radar camouflage, later 
known as stealth. How were you introduced to the subject?  And what 
qualifications were necessary to work in that discipline? 
00:12:37	 Bahret: Actually, the work on stealth was sort of an accident or a by-
product of trying to do other things.  As you know, in World War II, radar 
became available.  People were trying to make magnetrons and klystrons 
and all of the kinds of things to make a radar work.  They would sit out 
there when opposing forces were attacking and they’d look at the radar 
and say, “Hmm, isn’t that interesting.”  But the fact of the matter was one 
of the things in, well, in the radar range equation—which is the thing that 
determines the performance of a radar—one of the numbers in there is the 
cross-section, the echo size, of a target, be it a tank or a submarine or a 
satellite or what. And nobody knew what those numbers were.  In fact, 
you probably never heard of a guy named Kip Siegell—he was a great 
man up at the University of Michigan, and subsequently he had his own 
outfit—but Kip once made a statement.  He said, “If somebody asked me
what the echo area of a B-25 is,” he said, “I can look in ten books and get 
you ten different numbers.”  It was that sort of thing.  So when I joined the 
laboratory, I was assigned to a project where they were trying to learn how 
to quantify this magic number.  And it isn’t all that easy.  Should I speak 
about this for a little bit? 
00:14:33 	 Brown: Please do. 
00:14:35 	 Bahret: There are only three ways to determine the radar echo.  One is to 
calculate it. One, of course, is to measure the actual machine.  And the 
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third is, perhaps, to use scale models and make a measurement.  Well, 
measuring the actual machine is jolly, except it is about as useless as air 
brakes on a turtle when it comes to designing something, because 
obviously to measure it, you have to have it.  It’s a done thing. 
So what you’re looking for, really, are techniques that permit you 
to design something and predict the outcome.  Hence, model 
measurements or something of that sort, or mathematical techniques are 
the ways to go, really. The trouble, however, is that no matter which way 
you go, you have to understand how to model the subject, whether it be an 
aircraft or satellite or a ship or anything.  What about that object creates 
the echo?  Well, it’s not always obvious.  And so what we were doing was 
research on those kinds of problems.  How do you actually model 
something and come up with the right answer?  Now, mathematical 
techniques are attractive because you don’t have to go to a lot of trouble 
with facilities and so forth and so on. But remember back in the ‘50s— 
today, to do some of these problems, it could—well, I’ve run programs on 
a, on IBM 7090s and big computers that lasted all night long!  And I’d get 
a call the next day saying, “Bahret, what are you doing here?  You tied the 
whole facility for the whole thing?”  I said, “I’m sorry, but that’s how long 
the equations take.” Well picture that, now, twenty years before that, and 
say, what could you do?  Well, you’re almost like the guy with the abacus 
trying to do earthshaking problems.  You just can’t do it. 
So, really theoretical techniques, people worked on them, and so 
forth and so on, but the model techniques were the main focus because 
they seemed closest to being realistic and also a much simpler way to get 
answers. I compare it, for instance, if you have a flying machine, say a B-
25, whatever, B-52, if you’re on the ground making measurements, there 
are only a certain range of what we call aspect angles that are possible.  
Unless you have some kind of a heroic pilot who is likely willing to turn a 
B-52 upside down and fly, you can’t get the top of the aircraft, for 
instance, if you’re on the ground. Those kind of things come into play, 
whereas, if you have models, you can put it on a support any old way you 
want. So, again, that’s why model measurements were the focus.   
But yet, the question was, what really contributes to the echo?
Now, if you have the actual machine, and you have a good measurement 
radar, and you go out and measure it, you can be the village idiot and you 
get the right number, because what it is, happens.  But if you try to model 
that dude, then the question is, what parts are important and what parts are 
not?  And until you know that answer, you’re going to get the wrong 
number.  I’ll give you an idea. For instance, you know what a jet tailpipe 
with an afterburner in it, it’s got a lot of hardware in there. Well, how 
much of that do you really have to model, and how, to get the right 
answer, even if you make a scale model?  Those kind of things forced us 
into studying what made a significant difference and what didn’t.  And, for 
example, for most jet fighter aircraft, in the frontal sector, which is very 
important, the skin and other things like that make no difference at all, 
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because the energy that’s hitting those is going elsewhere.  Whereas, it 
turned out that jet inlets, antennas on the front of the aircraft, the cockpit 
canopy and all of that, those were the things that were significant.  In fact, 
for a lot of planes you could model the aircraft without even putting the 
wings on it, if all you want to know is what it looked like in the front, 
because two or three major factors dominated the echo, gave it ninety-five 
percent of it. And those are the kind of things, we had to find those 
things out by trial and error. We had to build a model, and then we’d 
make an intake duct or whatever and put a fake engine face in the back 
there and we’d get a number and then we’d say, well, is that really 
contributing?  And we’d take absorber materials and stuff in the hole and 
that kind of thing, trial and error. You try to find out what is significant, 
and eventually you do. 
But it’s not one, a single answer either, because in radar, of course, 
you have a tremendous range of frequencies.  They go from very low 
frequencies, which are generally used for early warning and that sort of 
thing, to very high frequencies, which are used for missile guidance, attack 
on the, on the aircraft, for instance, if it’s an aircraft.  And so you have to 
worry about what contributes to the echo at various parts of the spectrum,
and that changes! If you get very, very far down in the frequency 
spectrum, the details like a jet engine or an antenna or something, are 
trivial. It’s generally the bulk size of the fool thing, you know.  I mean a 
fighter aircraft will look like cross-dipoles, the wings and so forth and so 
on. And so the answer to what contributes to the echo varies with 
frequency and with polarization. Radar has polarization just as light does, 
and you have to worry about all these things.  So there was a lot to do to 
answer the question. 
But to get back to your first question, how did it wind up doing 
signature control, after you began to understand what created the echo, 
you’d say, “Hmm, isn’t that interesting?  I wonder if we can do something 
about that?”  And so, you start trying this, that, or the other thing and see 
what difference it makes.  And that’s where it got very interesting.  I’d like 
to say too, though, that we had a very small staff, and that meant that 
every time we discovered a problem, we didn’t necessarily have the smarts 
or the people or anything else to do it ourselves.  So what we had to do 
then was to go out and hire adjunct to our staff as you will—a contractor
to do this, or something like that.  For example, in radar absorber 
materials, we’re electromagnetic people, electronics guys, and we didn’t 
know diddly about mixing gunk and goos and making absorbers.  So we 
had to go out and get plastics people, or structures people, and so forth and 
so on. And in that process, I might say, in all truth, that the other labs at 
the base came into play there, because we weren’t stupid enough to think 
we could solve these problems by ourselves, so we’d go over to Flight 
Dynamics Laboratory or Materials Laboratory or wherever, and say, “Hey, 
smart fellow, would you like to work on something pretty interesting?”   
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And so the thing began to grow like topsy because there were so 
many facets to it, and it got more and more interesting all the time.  For 
example, one of the problems had to do with antennas.  Now, you talk to 
antenna people, strictly antenna people, about this, and they’ll say, 
“What’s the problem?  I know all about my antenna.”  The fact of the 
matter is the poor soul doesn’t know diddly about his antenna.  He knows 
how it works as it was designed to work in a certain narrow part of the 
spectrum, but you see the bad guys have the option of using any part of the 
spectrum they choose.  And you ask most antenna men, “How does that 
antenna work at three time the operating frequency?  Or ten percent of the 
operating frequency?”  “Duh.” They just don’t know.  They’d never had 
to worry about it.   
Well, when you get into this day and game, you worry about it.  
And it turns out that even though you may have, for instance, an x-band 
antenna, ten gigahertz on a radar on an aircraft—common for fighters, for 
instance—if the guy, well, what happens if I look at that with twenty 
gigahertz?  Let me tell you what happens.  It looks as big as a house! But 
it has nothing to do with the operation of that thing on the aircraft.  But we 
have to worry about it. So, that’s a big project to try to solve some of 
those things, because the last thing in the world that anybody will sit for is
you fouling up their handiwork. And when you come in there and say, 
“Well that antenna just won’t do.”  They say, “Well, excuse you, we’ll call 
you. Don’t call us!” So we had to get people, and that was a long-term
project. I mean this took probably ten or fifteen years to really come up 
with a good solution. 
00:26:41 	 Brown: And what time period would this have been—the 1950s, the 
1960s? 
00:26:47 	 Bahret: Yes, well, most of the basic problems were identified by the late
1950s. In fact, in the very early 1960s, most people don’t know it but we 
retrofit the entire Hound Dog fleet with reduced signature techniques.  
And they flew for ten years more with that, and nobody even knew they 
were there.  In fact, there’s one in the Air Force Museum.   
00:27:19 	 Brown: And the Hound Dog was a missile that went with the B-52 
bombers, intended to attack the Soviet Union? 
00:27:28 	 Bahret: True.  It was a nuclear-powered, long-range, jet-engine missile, 
and it was just like a skinny shape, basically.  There was no inlet. There 
was no cockpit, no nothing. I don’t mean no inlet.  No antenna or 
anything like that. It was inertially guided.  But there was an inlet. And, 
this, you ask, “Well how did this happen?”  Well, I can tell you how this 
happened. 
When we first started to make measurements, we built a facility in 
the lab, and people kept coming and saying, “Hey, how about you measure 
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our thing,” and so forth and so on. Well, the lab chief came up and said, 
“Bahret, you’re supposed to be doing research.  You’re not supposed to be 
doing routine measurements.”  He said, “If all these people want this 
work, set up a facility someplace—routine measurement facility—and 
we’ll send all the models down there or whatever.”  And so it happened. 
We got the first facility of the kind was down at Radiation Incorporated, 
down in Melbourne, Florida. Out in the middle of their garbage dump, by 
the way, to keep it secure. 
But anyhow, guy named Jack Copa [name?], he was a captain 
down in the Hound Dog SPO at the time. He subsequently got to be the 
commander of the system—I mean the space command out on the west 
coast—but at the time was a captain, and he came up and said, “Bahret, 
you measured our Hound Dog missile, and it looks as big as a fighter 
airplane.” He said, “I don’t believe it.”  I said, “But, Jack, I didn’t make it 
up. We measured it.”  “I don’t believe you,” he said.  “Okay, Jack, let’s 
go.” We went down to Florida, went out in the dump, and we put the 
missile up and—bigger than a house!  And he said, “Why is that?”  I said, 
“Because it’s got that big engine inlet.”  He says, “Can you prove that?”  I 
said, “Sure.” I had the guys go out and put a metal cone over the engine 
so that nothing got in. It all just scattered.  The echo went out of sight, 
you know, down. He says, “That’s, that’s amazing.”  I said, “No, it’s not. 
That’s what should happen.” He said, “What can we do about it?”  And I 
said, “Well, I think I know how I can do something about it.”  So they 
subsequently gave a contract to the guy out in Tulsa who was building it, 
and they made a fix that went in the engine inlet.  Never in fifteen years 
did they ever have a downtime on a B-52 because the Hound Dog missile 
didn’t work. And by the way, every time the B-52 took off or landed, they 
powered up the Hound Dog engines to help.  That was reliable. 
Well, that got me into trouble, by the way.  There was a general 
named Egan who was then the head of NORAD, the North American Air 
Defense Command out in Colorado Springs.  And one day, I was patiently 
sitting at my desk doing something, and the secretary came in and said, 
“Mr. Bahret, there’s a two-star general at the door, in a flying suit, and he 
wants you.” I said, “What I’d do now?”  Now at the time, we were in 
“The Barn,” which we’ll talk about later, but it’s an obscure building on 
the base. And so, he came in, and we sat down.  He said, “Bahret,” he 
said, “is this Hound Dog really as small as you, as we think?”  I said, 
“Yeah.” He said, “Well the reason I like to ask you that is because every 
once in a while the Air Defense Command fighters used to run intercepts 
on them.”  They would actually fire a Hound Dog off a B-52. And he 
says, “Several times lately, my group has looked up and seen this thing 
right in front of their cockpit, and we didn’t like that.”  So we talked and 
talked. He says, “Okay.” He went away.  Well, turned out, you know I 
don’t know how he gets friends like this, but he had flown in from
Colorado Springs. He’d gone out to the base and picked up a T-33, flew 
in over here at the base, called for a base taxi, got over to my building, got 
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the taxi, went back and got in his plane and left.  Guess what happened?
We have a thing on the base called protocol.  They take a dim view of 
two-stars generals running around the base in flying suits without escorts.  
And they came up and started to give me grief, you know, and said, 
“Bahret, what’s the matter with you?  You’re not supposed to have that.” 
I said, “Okay. What do you want me to do the next time a two-star 
general shows up at the door?”  Well, that was the end of that. Lot of fun.   
00:32:38 	 Brown: Again, some questions related to the early years.  In the post-
World War II period, immediately after the end of the war, a very 
important document was produced, and that would be the report entitled 
Toward New Horizons by the Scientific Advisory Group.  And the product 
of that would really set the research and development agenda for the Air 
Force for well into the Cold War.  In the section on counter-measures, 
there’s an interesting statement on camouflage against detection by radar, 
which would suggest that even in those early years that they appreciated 
what could be done. And yet it would be some time before stealth 
technology would really be a priority.  Was it difficult to get the concept 
of stealth accepted within the Air Force? 
00:33:39 	 Bahret: I would have to say yes. And I think the reason was that we were 
in the laboratories. But there was a whole other organization at Wright 
Field called the Systems SPOs, okay.  And, generally speaking, they were 
run by managers, shall we say, many of them non-technical.  They pretty 
much listened to their contractors, and their contractors were always 
pushing the state of the art just to use techniques that had been known for 
years. I mean, you know, they were always asking them to build an 
aircraft that flew twice the speed and twice as far and so forth, and they 
were pushed just to do that. And they weren’t too anxious to hear some
jerk from the laboratory come along and say, “Well now, boys, we have to 
do this.” Okay?  So between the SPO mentality and—not that I have
anything against it, you understand, they’ve done remarkable things—but 
between that thinking and the contractor influence, there wasn’t a lot of 
dancing in the streets over the prospect of having to incorporate this sort 
of thing. Took a while. 
00:35:19 	 Brown: Mr. Bahret, we’re going a short break right now, before we 
resume the questioning. 
00:35:25 	 Bahret: Okay. 
[Recording paused] 
00:35:29	 Brown: Mr. Bahret, you’ve spoken about the need for facilities to do this 
work. Much of the investigations took place in a building here at Wright-
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Patterson, Building 821, that was known locally as “The Barn” because of
its unique shape. Why was this building chosen? 
00:35:55 	 Bahret: Well, can I tell you an interesting story about the building? 
00:35:58 	 Brown: Please do. 
00:35:59 	 Bahret: We have all kinds of digressions here.  As you know, things 
sometimes take a long time to be brought to fruition.  Now in World War 
II, they were developing radars, some of which were fairly large, 
physically. Well, doing that out in a rainstorm is not really a good way to 
work, so somebody said, “Why don’t we design a building that the radars 
can penetrate?” So I don’t remember where, it may have been down at 
Naval Research Lab or Pax River or someplace, somebody built a building
out of wood, and it was the same design as, as Building 821.  And the Air 
Force decided hey, we want one of those, too.  So I guess it must have 
been in the 1945 or ’44, something like that, they put in to get one.  It was 
built, finally, in 1948, and by that time, everybody forgot what the devil 
they wanted it for! So it lay up on the hill there for a long time empty.  
Meantime, we were looking for a wide-open, big building that we 
could put facilities in—because you have to have certain amount of room 
to do this—to measure aircraft characteristics and materials and other 
things. And so we were allowed to move into 821, and we put an anechoic 
chamber in there.  I wish I had a picture to show you, but by today’s 
standards, it’s so crude that people would giggle.  But nevertheless it was 
the only game in town.  It was kind of interesting in a way because the 
building was transparent, and, to some degree, and we had kind of 
sensitive equipment, had to make it that way deliberately.  Well, it turned 
out that Building 821 is located right beside what used to be the road to 
Wright Field garbage dump.  And so we would have a model ballistic 
missile nose cone or something up, measuring it, and the garbage truck 
would go by on the road. And we found out there wasn’t a lot of call for 
data on a ballistic missile with a garbage truck behind it.  So we 
subsequently had to put metal plates and other things there on the side, 
you know, to hide them.  How did we get on that?  But anyhow, yes, we 
moved into the building and subsequently used it for twenty years.   
00:39:02 	 Brown: You mentioned putting anechoic chambers inside the structure.  
Can you give a layman’s description of what an anechoic chamber would 
be? 
00:39:12 	 Bahret: Yes. The idea, of course, is to keep the surroundings from
entering into the measurement.  And that can be tricky because what it 
requires is that you build materials that can basically be almost non-
reflective. That’s impossible, of course, but what you can do is reduce the 
reflection very much.  And typically these absorber materials that are used
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in what we call anechoic chambers are pyramidal structures made of 
carbon foam and that sort of thing. And if they’re well-designed, you can 
cover a wall with this material and reduce the echo from that wall by five 
or six orders of magnitude.  That’s a lot.  And, generally speaking, that’s 
fairly effective in this kind of thing.  But, you know, it’s expensive to 
build these things.  These absorber materials, of course, take a lot of work 
to build, and then you have to install them in fancy ways and so forth and 
so on. Yes, the anechoic chamber and, I might add, the supports for 
models were always the subject of continuing worry.  Because you see, in
the work of reducing signature, it’s a guaranteed employment type of thing 
because every time you know how to get the signature down, then you 
have to go back and build a chamber which has lower echoes, then you 
can build the signature down, and on ad nauseam, you know.  So it’s a lot 
of interesting things. 
00:41:27 	 Brown: Let me ask you to make a connection, then, between the work you 
previously described—the necessary work of being able to do the 
mathematical models and the predictions with the use of the experimental 
facilities in The Barn.  Was that a direct correlation?  Was there a direct tie 
between the two? 
00:41:47	 Bahret: I have to say that because of the computer limitations as well as 
limitations on electromagnetic theory, the mathematical approach was 
never up to the measurement approach. An example: I’ve been asked to 
talk and everything at a lot of big time conferences of electromagnetic’s 
theorists. One I recall was one of the University of Illinois in Chicago, 
and they had just about everybody you could name who could even spell 
electromagnetics.  And one night, well, you know, you had canned 
speeches and all, this fellow gave his pet theory—and incidentally it’s sort 
of a bad thing and I’ve had a thing with the universities over this.  If I had 
my way, universities would trade professors every once in a while, and the 
answer is, what reason why?  Because Professor X, he gets on to a certain 
approach, and he teaches his students that approach, and they continue that
approach, and that’s that university. Go to another university, it’s the 
same, different thing, okay.  And what you’d like to have is somebody 
who could step in there and compare different ones or combine them or do 
something like this, but that’s very hard to happen with the university 
system.  But that’s another subject. 
But anyhow, one evening after the formal hour—anyway, dinner 
was over and everything—some of the fellows got me in a little corner of
a small conference room in this big building, and we started talking.  And 
they wanted to know if I had my druthers, what would theorists really be 
worrying about?  Well that started at about 7:30, after dinner, and I think 
at 11 o’clock, the room was filled, the hall was filled, and all these 
people—somehow the word got around—and here was questions and, you 
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know, just like that. And what they were interested in what I thought we 
ought to do, but they hadn’t a clue as to how to do it.   
And the end, and this is what I’m talking about, theoreticians are 
very good at calculating scattering from a surface, but as I’ve said several 
times now, the things that cause big echoes are not surfaces, but they are 
what we call apertures.  Apertures are anything—garbage pail, antenna, an 
inlet—that captures energy, and it runs in and around and everything and 
comes back out somehow.  In apertures—a wave guide is a good 
example—there are modes to the way like waves or something like that, 
wave structures, you know, that move in the ocean.  Well, electromagnetic 
waves behave like that when they get into confined spaces.  Well, as I said 
before, you don’t have to worry about the simple case where like a wave 
guide duct is the right size to propagate a certain frequency.  What you 
have to worry about is a frequency far removed from that.  And when that 
happens, the mode theory goes to pot, and all hell breaks loose.  By itself, 
it’ll happen with the radar, and you don’t even know about it.  You don’t 
have to. But if you want to predict it, you have to understand that, and to 
this day, apertures bug electromagnetic theorists because all the 
possibilities, things that can happen.  And that’s why we sat there and 
talked for hours that night, and these were all the smart guys in the 
country. I wasn’t one of them, but you know somebody has to tell them, 
well, here’s the problem, fellows.  Not scattering from a surface.  They 
were good at that. Sorry. 
00:46:48 	 Brown: As the basic knowledge of radar signature, these echoes, begin to 
develop, at some point this begins to transition into the idea of applying 
these theories to a complete vehicle, a complete airplane.  When did that 
transition begin to occur, and what was the motivation? 
00:47:16 	 Bahret: Oh, I think motivation after a while was very clear.  It became
obvious that classic design approaches, brute force techniques, did not 
work. Vietnam was a case in point.  We had the highest performance 
aircraft. We had jammers, everything else.  We had “Wild Weasels,” and 
still we lost a lot of planes and a lot of people.  And I had a friend named 
Bill Eveston [name?], he’s dead now, but he used to head up the 
Advanced Development Group in the lab for Electronic Warfare.  Mostly 
they were at the stage of building jammers and things like this that would 
go on aircraft.  And Bill and I used to give talks sometimes, and I’d get up
and tell them, “Well, folks, you know, if you reduce the echo of the 
airplane by a factor of ten, which is relatively easy to do, even as a 
retrofit,” I said, “that means you can reduce the size of the jammer by a 
factor of ten.” That means you have a lot less weight, a lot less cost, a lot 
less maintenance, and so forth and so on.  And Bill Eveston [name?] used 
to invariably stand up and say, “Bahret, you’re blowing smoke.”  He said, 
“If we had an aircraft that was ten times smaller,” he says, “I’d still use the 
same jammer, except now it would be effective.”   
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When those things began to sink in, I think people got very, very 
serious about this. They realized what I said was true.  It may cost you 
more money in the design stages and everything in the first few aircraft or 
whatever it is you’re building, but, my lord, you saved that money back 
over the lifetime of the machine.  I mean look at the F-117 as a case in 
point, for God’s sakes. I mean, we lost one and that was an accidental 
shot. Some guy, you know, they weren’t shooting at the airplane.  They 
were just shooting into the air, and the laws of physics say one of them is
bound to hit someday.  That was the only one ever lost. And those things 
were not, you know, some of those were not lost to the Russians.  They 
understood what they were up against now. 
00:50:15	 Brown: Let me ask you to amplify a little bit on the Air Force’s 
experience in Southeast Asia, in Vietnam, and how it affected Air Force 
thinking. Certainly that conflict created unanticipated demands on the Air 
Force. It was a conflict quite unlike what had been anticipated for 
Western Europe or a strategic conflict with the Soviet Union, and as you 
suggested, the Air Force began to have real difficulties in accomplishing 
their missions.  Did that begin to, in itself, create demands for new 
technology, and did the Cold War and the Soviet threat become lesser?
Was there a shift in emphasis? 
00:51:10 	 Bahret: Oh, no, I think the thought was that the Cold War, if it became a 
hot war, would be Vietnam squared.  They would just have that many 
more of the same threats.  So anything that was done to improve things in 
Vietnam would clearly help in the larger conflict.   
One example—but, and this is I said early on, you know, when 
things get tough, all of a sudden bureaucracies go away and all kinds of 
good things happen in a hurry because everybody stands aside.  Case in 
point was the weapon that was used a lot in Vietnam, the anti-radiation 
missile.  There were two kinds. One was the Shrike and the other was 
what they called the Standard ARM.  These were the two missiles that 
were commonly used. These missiles, if you don’t know, cost around four 
hundred thousand dollars a piece. An anti-radiation missile has a very, 
very small warhead.  To do any damage, it really has to hit the target 
straight on. I mean, for instance, a lot of times they would hit an antenna.  
Well, the other guy just through another antenna on the radar, it was fine.  
So then finally, the other guy learned, “Well, hey, you know, if I see one 
coming, I just turn the radar off for a minute, it loses its guidance.”  And 
so we probably scare a few guys picking in the rice paddy next door, but 
conflict-wise, we didn’t do anything.  And so it turned out that the 
effectiveness of these expensive anti-radiation missiles—thousands and 
thousands of which were shot—was about four percent.  Four percent of 
them did any significant damage.  Now, that’s pretty poor, okay.  You 
know, that’s like the command at Bunker Hill, “Don’t fire ‘til you see the 
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white of their eyes,” and then half of the guys were blind and some of 
them were cross-eyed and so forth, you know.  Not very effective. 
And so somebody came in, again, you know, no paperwork, no 
nothing. “Bahret, we have a problem.  Somehow or other, those guys 
know we’re coming, and what can you do to help us?”  And they said, 
“What would you need to answer the question?”  I said, “Well, for one 
thing, we’d need a couple of missiles.  One of each, you know. We have 
to have something to study or measure.”  They said, “You got it.” And 
within a week, they ordered Texas Instrument who made the Shrike and 
General Dynamics out in San Diego who made the Standard ARM, they 
ordered them to run a production run, just keep one going down the line 
except don’t put the warhead in it and don’t put the propellant in it.  And 
we had that, set it up on the range, measured it, and told them how to fix 
the problem.  And that took probably three weeks.  Now in at normal 
cycle, that’d take, if you did it in three years, you’d be lucky, you know.  
But in those days, you needed it now, and it was a matter of saving lives, 
you know. Drop your fork and get on with the job. 
End of Video Tape 1 
[not on video, but included in audio file]
00:55:05 	 Brown: Let me call a pause once again.  We’ll take a, take a break for a 
few minutes and, and then we’ll resume. 
00:55:06 	 Bahret: Okay. ] 
Start of Video Tape 2 
00:00:00 	 Brown: Mr. Bahret, periodically the Air Force or other defense agencies, 
or in some case our allies, would conduct a technology forecasting 
exercise, an attempt to predict the future, an attempt to predict the role that 
technology might have.  Was signature technology ever considered in one 
of those projects?  And did you participate?  And what was your 
contribution? 
00:00:31 	 Bahret: Yes, it certainly was. In fact, one of the biggest ones that NATO 
ever had was a thing called Project 2000, and this took place in the late, 
well, eighty-six, mid-1980s.  I was assigned to that. It is a bit of a bitter 
story from my wife’s viewpoint because it started in Paris in January of 
the year, two days after we had a humongous snowstorm, and I left and 
she was there standing with a snow shovel, which didn’t sit too well. 
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But, yes, I was sent to participate in that.  And some of those 
problems got a little tricky because we didn’t share—and I suspect we still 
don’t—everything we know. And so it became a little touchy sometimes 
to say, “Well, boys.”  They’d say, “Okay, what are we going to see in the 
year 2000?”  And I’d say, “You’re going to see low signature as a 
requirement on all vehicles.”  But, you see, you couldn’t elaborate. I 
couldn’t give a course on that, because then you’re getting into touchy 
ground and you had to ask— “Take my word for it, guys, and put it down 
as a thing to worry about.” 
Because it affects, you see, not only the offensive systems— 
airplanes and ships—but the defensive systems that NATO was worrying 
about—radars and everything else.  And it’s a real problem to the radar 
guy. I mean, there have been symposia, one I recall up at Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, where these people were talking about the design 
of advanced radar systems.  And they asked me to go up and tell them
about this stealth nonsense and how it affected them.  And there were 
times when they’d ask, “What can I do about our current operating 
systems,” and I’d say, “Pray.”  Because I think that’s one of the main 
reasons, not the main reason, one of the big reasons that the Cold War 
ended because the Russians, they knew they were dead in the water with, 
you know, ten thousand or how many radars all over the place and none of 
them could cope with this new threat. And they couldn’t afford to go back 
and redesign those. 
00:03:35 	 Brown: In the 1970s, the Air Force began to sponsor construction of 
experimental vehicles, specifically to exploit new theories, new 
knowledge of stealth technologies. Were you aware of this initiative?
Were you personally involved?  Did you see this as a culmination of all of
the years of work assembling the basic knowledge of signature reduction? 
00:04:08 	 Bahret: It certainly made me feel good, if that’s what you mean.  Yes, I 
was involved in almost every vehicle, exotic vehicle, you can think of, 
starting with the U-2. Spent a lot of time out at the Skunk Works.  Kelly 
Johnson and I had many a strong debate over some of the techniques, 
which he said would never work. But if you look at the F-117, you’ll find 
out someone else at least disagreed with him.
One thing was windshield canopy coatings and things like that.  It 
became rather easy to come up with coatings you could put on windshields 
and keep the energy from going in the cockpit, for instance, and reflecting 
off things like the bulkhead and the pilot’s head and all other kinds of 
dense objects. But Kelly didn’t think much of that idea.  He said, 
“Bahret,” he said, “you put that coating on there and the guy’s going to see 
ten sets of instruments at night, because they reflect.”  And I said, “Kelly, 
go to the camera people and ask them about anti-reflective coatings and 
put that over this other thing. I don’t care what you put over it.  Just put 
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this on there to begin with.” And eventually, again you asked before was 
it tough to convince some of them, yes, it was.   
But one of the interesting things which we haven’t talked about too 
much, I’ve talked something about echo sources and how you might do 
something about them and all.  But that’s all well and good, but the most 
powerful technique of all is shaping.  And that’s where flight dynamics 
people and the propulsion people and everybody else get in the act 
because if you shape the thing properly, oh man, are you way ahead of the 
game.  Again, F-117 is the case in point.  And that twists the 
aerodynamics guys, the structures guys and other people out of their 
normal routine because it’s back to the drawing boards now.  We’ve got to 
start over with some new stupid looking shape and make that fly.  And 
that’s sometimes more difficult that it appears.
00:07:01 	 Brown: I can assure you, coming from the flight dynamics viewpoint, it 
was very difficult to accept. It was very hard to get used to this notion of 
incorporating low-signature requirements into a vehicle, into the stealth 
class of vehicles. It was a great challenge throughout the industry.   
00:07:25 	 Bahret: Yes, well, it bothers me sometimes that the public, encouraged by 
the media, get heartburn over the cost of some of these systems.  But they 
don’t understand for one minute what goes into making one of them.  You 
know, I take the people through the Air Force Museum a lot, and one of 
the things I worked on—I won’t say helped design, but I was involved 
with—was the SR-71. Well, most people don’t have the foggiest idea of 
what went into the SR-71 design. I mean, and mind you we had to make 
absorber materials that would stand up to these things.  Most people, okay, 
I tell them this.  When this plane is flying at 75,000 feet at Mach 3, the 
stagnation temperature—the temperature the surface arises—is 637 
degrees Fahrenheit. Now, I said, you probably don’t know what 637 
degrees Fahrenheit is. But, I say, go home, turn on your electric range and 
when the burner gets red-hot, it’s around 637 degrees Fahrenheit.   
Now, what does that tell us?  Six-hundred thirty-seven degrees 
Fahrenheit is far above the flash-point of any jet engine fuel.  What does 
that mean?  It means when you get the plane up there cooking, it’s going 
to explode, unless you make a fuel that can stand more than 637 degrees.  
What else does it mean?  It means that the tires on which the plane would
land would normally drip out of the wheel wells after a little while, 
because it’s far above the melting point of rubber tires.  So what?  You 
have to design tires that can stand 637 degrees.  Fifty million dollars for 
that airplane?  You bet your booties!  But, by George, if you didn’t do it, 
the thing would never fly. And that’s what happens when you get into the 
stealth design. You start having to make all these changes.   
00:09:55 Brown: Let me shift slightly and, and ask you about the workforce within 
the laboratories, your colleagues who worked here, and your relationship 
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with the universities and the graduate programs there.  The workforce at 
Wright-Patterson is characterized by a rather unique blend of civilian 
specialists and military officers.  Did you find that to be a satisfactory 
arrangement? 
00:10:26	 Bahret: Well, in the end, in accordance with the Peter Principle, where, 
you know, you rise to your level of mediocrity, I was a branch chief, and I 
had about fifty scientists and engineers working.  A percentage of them
were military, and good technical people for the most part.  But I always
had trouble with the notion of the military people in the labs.  A good 
example is most of the people they put in as lab chiefs--and I’m not saying 
this to be nasty to anybody, please—but normally, the military had the 
idea that any person could do any job, which I personally think is 
nonsense. But they would grab someone of the proper rank and put them
in that chair. We had a brilliant guy. He had a Ph.D., but he was the head 
of one of the most sophisticated electronics labs in the world.  He had a 
Ph.D. in aeronautical engineering. Well that was very nice, but he 
couldn’t, he didn’t know a microwave from a permanent wave, and it just 
doesn’t fit. 
And personally, I like the way that most countries in the world do 
it. They have a central research organization which serves all the services.  
And military people can work there, but basically they have to take off
their uniform and become another worker-bee.  And any of the services 
who want work done there, they come in and they say, “Here, I’d like you 
to do this.” And the guy says, “Well, okay, this is what it will cost.”  And 
they go at it like that. And the reason they do it is because so many of the 
needs of the different services overlap, and so over here we have each 
service with its own little laboratory duplicating all the time.  And 
personally I don’t think that’s smart. 
00:13:12 	 Brown: What about the relationship with universities, engineering 
departments within universities, their graduate programs.   
00:13:22 	 Bahret: Well, I have to say we were very lucky.  We, as I said before, we 
had to get people who could do some of these problems for the length of 
time that it takes.  In other words, it was labor intensive, if you will.  And 
we didn’t have the people. So we went to these different universities to 
get work done, and in the process, there were certain advantages that 
accrued to the laboratory. For example, at Ohio State University, I 
regularly used to get a list of the Ph.D. graduating class.  And that let me
look over and get some of the better people, and I had some really good 
people. I tell you I would stack my branch up against anybody.  But it got 
pretty bad after a while because, I don’t know what it is in this country, 
but a lot of people are just not willing to work the way that some of the 
people in other countries. One of the graduating classes in 
electromagnetics from Ohio State University, out of thirty-three people, 
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three were Americans.  Now, why is that bad?  Because I can’t hire the 
other thirty. They don’t have clearances, and most of them couldn’t get 
clearances. Three out of thirty, ten percent.  Come on.  We’re going to go 
down the tubes if that keeps up for very long.  But, it was an advantage to 
know all these people. 
I was also frequently on the team that was sent by the Personnel 
Office to go up and recruit, and another opportunity to be a little self-
serving. That was a lot of fun.  I enjoyed that. 
00:15:41 	 Brown: Mr. Bahret, if I could, some final reflections on the Cold War.  
With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the final collapse of the Soviet 
Union in 1992, all of that seemed to occur very quickly.  And to many 
individuals, it was a surprise.  Did the conclusion of the Cold War, the end 
of the Cold War, the swiftness with which it happened, did that surprise 
you?  Or had you foreseen some of these events? 
00:16:18 	 Bahret: Well, of course I had no way of knowing when something like 
that would happen, but we, again in my former life, I had opportunities 
while I worked, as I told you, with the intelligence people an awful lot.  In 
fact, they used to ask us to do assessments of what we thought the Soviets 
would be doing in a certain area, you know, in terms of, well, measuring.  
Were they developing low cross-section vehicles?  Well, you have to have 
certain kinds of facilities to do that, and, if they’d give us photographs 
taken even from satellites, you could tell from the design, the layout, and 
everything else, you knew that that the facility did not have the ability to 
even measure something that had very low echo because the supports and
everything were too big. You could tell from that.   
Also, in my branch, I had one group that did foreign material 
exploitation, which means by means of, by hook or by crook, we got a 
hold of, somebody got hold of and brought us, Soviet equipment.  And so 
we had a bit of an idea of where they stood.  And, I don’t know. I never 
had the warm feeling as did a lot of people that they were, you know, the 
ten-foot gorilla. They just didn’t have that power.  I’m not saying they 
were stupid or anything like that, but they just didn’t have the technology 
edge that would keep them out front at all. And, to me, that said, you 
know, the handwriting was on the wall. They just couldn’t keep going the 
way they did. I mean, they did a job on the Germans in World War II, but 
that was mainly because they sacrificed lives as if they didn’t matter.  
They just, you know, if the Germans killed two hundred, they sent in two 
thousand, and sure, you’re going to win like that.  But attrition, 
particularly if you get into a nuclear environment, attrition is going to beat 
you every day. 
00:19:08	 Brown: And so in the decades then that we have come to think of as the 
Cold War, and the ultimate outcome of it, how would you characterize the 
significance of Wright Field, this large Air Force installation devoted to 
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engineering, to technology, to the acquisition of future systems.  How 
would you describe the overall significance of this place during the Cold 
War?
00:19:39	 Bahret: Oh, I think it had a tremendous influence, because, again, the 
technology in so many areas was being advanced.  And from what we 
could gather, the other guy wasn’t doing so well in some of these things.  
And, I don’t want to say it’s all good news and bad news.  For example, as 
you know, all Air Force airplanes have to land on runways.  No Soviet 
airplanes have to land on runways.  They’re all built to take off from a 
field. It means a whole lot of differences in design, but I guess I think that 
you can do more by taking off on a runway than you can on a field 
because you can’t carry the payload, you can’t do this, that, and the other 
thing off a dirt field. And so you know things like that.  I think our 
technology was just advancing so quickly, and, in that time, there were so 
many planes on the drawing boards and everything that it seemed like we 
were just destined to win. 
I might also say that the Wright Field laboratories were not 
restricted to Air Force things.  Particularly in the signature area, we had 
the good fortune to work on literally everything from submarines to 
satellites, tanks, helicopters for the Army, ships for the Navy, submarines 
for the Navy, satellites for the Air Force and others.  And that made the 
job a lot of fun, but it also meant that you could cross fertilize by using 
something from here over here and so forth and so on, which was a big 
advantage. Big advantage. And I think that also contributed.  If you look, 
for instance, at the design of any Navy ship, you will find that they no 
longer have boxy sides, which we always wondered about.  They used to 
say, it’s against the law to give aid and comfort to the enemy, we’d 
wonder why they’d build a ship like that?  And they don’t any more.  And 
so, lessons learned. 
00:22:45 	 Brown: As we close here, I’ll simply ask you if, on reflection of the 
various topics we’ve covered this afternoon, is there anything that we have 
failed to mention, any subject that we perhaps inadvertently skipped over, 
something that you would like to add here as we close.  If you want to take 
a few moments to reflect. 
00:23:13 	 Bahret: Well, I just wish that we could get into classified information, 
because it’s some of the actual numbers that make you understand the 
significance of some of the things I’ve talked about.  I haven’t described 
specifically how any technique, how much it reduces or anything like that, 
but it in those numbers that you begin to realize the impact that this work 
can have on system performance.  And it’s profound, I mean, when you 
can’t see the other guy. And it’s not matter of seeing him perfectly well.  
To bring a missile to bear on a target, you have to have constant track.  
You can’t have a track now and then a gap and then a track now. That 
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doesn’t work. You have to have a steady track while the missile is 
guiding, otherwise it doesn’t know where to go.  So, again, it’s the 
numbers and things of that sort.  There’s a lot that goes into these things.
I said before that shaping, for instance, was an important 
parameter.  It’s impossible to shape everything so that from any aspect 
angle—top, bottom, side, or any—it’s invisible.  You can’t do it. So what 
you have to do, you have to go in there and study the bad guy and how he 
operates and then see how he’s going to view you, and then worry about 
those aspect angles which are most important.  And a lot is involved in a 
system design.  You have to know how that system is going to operate in a 
hostile environment, and it just gets all the more fascinating for working 
with all the people who can do all these kinds of studies and see what you 
can come up with.  It’s a fascinating subject.  I loved it. 
00:25:40 	 Brown: Mr. Bahret, you’ve mentioned your participation in a NATO 
exercise and some sharing of information with our allies in Western 
Europe. There are other significant countries that also are involved in 
military technology, one of those being the country of Sweden, not a 
member of NATO, but clearly a country with very advanced technology.  
Did you have an opportunity to work with the Swedes, with the Swedish 
military establishments and their technology organizations? 
00:26:22 Bahret: As a matter of fact, I did. It was out of the blue. You have to 
understand that we were a small group, and we were the only game in 
town. So anybody who anywhere wanted to know anything about this 
basically came down and said, “Hey, can you help us a little bit?”  So one 
day I was called by the Pentagon, and they said, “We want you to go over 
to Sweden and give them some technical advice on signature work 
because we know they’re doing some of that.”  And they sent a colonel 
from the Pentagon along with us to baby-sit me so I didn’t say anything 
wrong. And they said, “Just don’t go too far with what you say over 
there.”   
But basically it boiled down to, back in 1963, we were the first 
technical support group from the United States to go over to Sweden to 
help them.  And, yes, they were not part of NATO, but I can tell you they 
appreciated what we did so much that in a week’s time, they took us 
through every one of their facilities, their underground bunkers.  They 
operated radars. They dropped chaff, and they did everything. They 
showed us all they did. They were really open and above board.   
But the week started with them getting up and we—the audience of 
three, there was another major with us, he was from the countermeasures 
group over at ASD—we three were the audience.  And they paraded I 
don’t know how many Swedish scientists and engineers up there, and they 
talked on what they were doing, this, that, and the other thing.  But it 
turned out that I listened to my counterpart describe their work. They were 
working on the Viggen, the Swedish aircraft, the Viggen. And, oh mercy, 
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I felt, I didn’t know what to do. I nudged the colonel in the middle.  I said, 
“What do you want me to do? Obviously they are totally wrong.  They’re 
wasting their time and their money and everything.”  He said, “Tell them.”  
I said, “Yes, sir.” So next day, they said, “Okay, America, it’s your turn.”  
We got up, and I started talking, because they scheduled the time we 
would talk, and I started talking about where I thought they were, you 
know, kind of like I said, well, I didn’t mind you thinking, but I didn’t 
much like what you thought. And we went from there.  And I told them
where they were wrong, and how to do it right, and so forth. Well, by the 
end of that day, the auditorium was filled.  I don’t know how many 
people, two hundred people or something sitting there, waiting to hear 
how they should be doing business on these things. And they were let me
say extremely grateful.  They put on a dog and pony show the rest of the 
week that I could not believe. We had our own aircraft with crews to fly 
us around to the different bases and everything of this sort.  It was—and, 
oh, we never had a lunch or dinner that wasn’t hosted by a general 
officer—it was quite an experience.   
But we had other opportunities that were, again being the only 
game in town, I was constantly—I was on that P-2000 study I mentioned 
for NATO, but I was also put on an A-Guard lecture series on radar echo,
and that went from place to place.  Again, the people in Europe who get 
on these committees, they like to travel.  And I mean you wind up all over 
the place. This radar echo lecture series, there were probably, oh, ten of 
us, I guess, and it was a three-day lecture series. And we went from, God 
where all, we were down in Munich, we were up in London. Oh, that was 
funny because they had us in the zoo, and then people thought that was an 
appropriate place for you nuts. And we went to Norway.  The Norway 
people were the smartest, because you see, they paid for this lecture series
no matter where it was.  I didn’t get any money, but somebody did.  And 
the Norwegians, they put us in a place called Bolkesjo, which you 
probably haven’t visited recently.  It is in the wintertime a ski resort way 
out in the mountains near where the Germans had that heavy water plant 
out there. And it’s beautiful country, except it’s so far out in 
nowheresville that there was no one left the place at night.  And they loved 
it because here they were, they had all the speakers captive, and all they 
had to do was buy you a big orange, and you’d talk for another hour, and 
they had free lectures all night long.  We had one of the guys was even 
sitting in the swimming pool, and the people in the pool were asking him 
questions. But, you know, those things were fun experiences I have to 
say. And I think it influenced people, too.  They had an awful lot of good 
questions, those folks, because again they didn’t have the research 
facilities or the money to do all these things.  And this was an opportunity 
for them to save a lot of money, to get it for free. 
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00:32:59 	 Brown: Now you mentioned the trips to Europe, the trips to Sweden, were 
there reciprocal visits?  Were there professional relationships that 
continued afterwards with individuals coming over here? 
00:33:11 	 Bahret: Oh, indeed. In fact, in many of these places, after they learned of 
some of the facilities we have here, they would get money and bring 
models over or anything to have them measured or so forth.  And then 
when they finished doing that, they’d come by Wright Field and show me
the data and say, “What do you think?”  So they got a lot of free help, I 
can tell you. But, you know, our government thought that was great.  I 
guess the State Department has as much to do with some of these things as 
we do. And I’ll tell you a story. My wife is deceased now, but a friend I 
met over there in Europe—my counterpart in Sweden—was a guy named 
Pere Erik Jung [name?] and he also liked to travel. And so he came over 
here all the time, and at the time, you know, in the ‘60s, I don’t know if 
any of you had the pleasure of going to Sweden, it’s a beautiful place, but 
you can’t afford it. It’s terribly expensive. In the ‘60s, steak in Sweden 
cost $25 a pound. So what my friend Jung would do, he would be out in 
say L.A. and coming back through here on his way back to Sweden.  He’d 
call my wife, and he’d say, “Jo, can you get me some steaks?” And she 
had a regular routine. She’d go up to the meat cutter, and she’d get him
one inch steaks. And it turned out, if we froze them, wrapped them in 
newspaper, put them in plastic bags, and he put them in his suitcase, they 
would still be frozen when they got to Sweden. And so we had a regular 
thing going there, where’d she’d get him a dozen steaks or something like 
that, and we were paying, you know, two or three dollars a pound maybe, 
and he was saving $22 dollars a pound or something.  And, yes, lot of 
good things. Not a lot of people we work with from England of course, 
we shared a lot of stuff with them.   
I haven’t mentioned though that in working in signature, it doesn’t 
always mean you’re trying to reduce it.  Camouflage in nature means 
blending in with the background. The animals know this.  So you really 
don’t always want to make something zero echo.  If you made a tank zero, 
for instance, on the ground it would stand out like a black hole.  It would 
be just as obvious as if you left it alone in the first place.  So it’s like I said 
about Professor Harold Hill, you better know the territory.  And so we 
spent a lot of time trying to go the other way, and increase echo.  Why?
The greatest, most effective counter-measure to an enemy defense is 
saturation. If you present him with a lot of targets, and he can’t tell them
one from the other, he’s either going to spend the gross national product in 
one attack trying to shoot down the one real plane among fifty decoys, or 
he’s going to lose. The plane’s going to get to him.  So we tried to make 
devices, echo enhancement we called them, that we could put on small 
decoys or drones or something like that and you just send them in willy-
nilly and let the other fellow figure it out if he could.  And this works, by 
the way, again, ground, air, and in the satellites, everywhere it works.  It’s 
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beautiful, and it’s just kind of amazing how many things you can do for a 
few bucks that costs the other guy millions to counter.  It’s an interesting 
game.   
00:38:06 	 Brown: Is that basic strategy applicable to the Navy, to seagoing vessels 
as it is to airborne systems?
00:38:18	 Bahret: Well, it’s tougher because the Navy vessels generally have much 
larger echo to contend with, but, yes, the Navy has, as a matter of fact, 
they use decoys all the time as a counter-measure to anti-ship missiles and 
all, sea-skimming missiles and everything that come in and whomp the 
ship. They use decoys as a way to pull them away from the real target.  
But again you see the Navy ships have much, much higher cross-sections 
than we have to contend with in the Air Force, so it’s a little different.  
But, they do that sort of thing all the time.  Of course, one of the best 
examples of it was the Israeli attack in the Baca Valley years ago, when 
they wiped out the other guy’s Air Force in a day or two, using decoys to 
get their missiles in the air and expended.  Then they’d go in and attack 
after the missiles were used.  Yes, it’s a very powerful technique, and it’s 
cost effective. These things that I’m talking about are small, you know.  
They may only be three or four feet long, and maybe a few inches in 
diameter, but they look like a big airplane.  And the other fellow has a 
problem.  And they’re easy to build. 
00:39:54 	 Brown: Mr. Bahret, you’ve mentioned your travels, both overseas, here 
within the United States.  You’ve mentioned how individuals come from
everywhere to Wright Field.  They came to visit your facilities.  You went 
to other places to give lectures and to talk.  In that process, undoubtedly, 
you met many notable personalities, some at high levels of government, 
others perhaps in industry. Do you recall any specific individual that you 
thought was very influential, or had insight into how the United States 
should pursue stealth technology? 
00:40:40	 Bahret: Oh, that’s a very hard question because it was always one of the 
delights of my life to be in a position of meeting and working with so 
many, many fine people.  Again being the only game in town, you know, I 
got places where a lot of other people did not.  And, I gave a talk in the 
White House one time, and I gave a talk to LeMay when he was the Chief 
of Staff and all this kind of stuff.  I don’t belong in those places, you 
know, but it would be hard to put my finger on any particular individual.  
It’s kind of interesting, the guy who was the vice president of Northrop 
and who was the chief designer of the B-2, he used to come to The Barn 
frequently and he’d say, “Bill, do you mind if I just sit here and take notes 
on how you guys do things and what you do, and so forth and so on.” 
John Cashen was his name. I said, “Be my guest, John, just don’t get the 
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way when I’m doing something. That’s all.”  He said, “I won’t.” But, you 
know, you meet all kinds of fabulous people.  It just makes life interesting. 
00:42:02 Brown: Mr. Bahret, thank you for your time your this afternoon.  We’ve 
appreciated all that you’ve told us.  We will now bring this interview to a 
close. 
00:42:12 Bahret: Thank you, sir. Thank you for the opportunity. 
End of Video Tape Two. 
End of Interview 
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